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Abstract
This paper explores the logic of patronage and its 
manifestation in a community-driven development 
project in two poor urban settlements in Bangladesh. 
It is seen from the case study that long-term patron-
clientelistic relationship has been more dominant than 
a short-term based brokerage system due to the existing 
typical socio-political culture in Bangladesh. The exertion 
of patron-clientelistic relationship depends primarily 
on the community specific socio-political context. This 
paper opines that the presence of multi-political parties’ 
influence in a community reduces the dominance of 
patron-clientistic logic in shaping social relationship. This 
in turn contributes to a more meaningful participation.
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INTRODUCTION
Various recent writings reveal the existence and 
continuation of patron-client relationships both in the 
northern and southern societies, and both in urban 
and rural settings (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009; 
Chandra, 2007; Cox, 2009; Kitscheld & Wilkinson, 
2007). Many, for example, Chandra (2007), and Kitscheld 
and Wilkinson (2007) perceive many of the relatively 
established democracies in the south as “patronage 
democracies”, where politics is critical for the survival 
of the poor since politics is a more effective channel 
than administrative ones for getting scarce resources and 
services. De Wit and Berner (2009) argue that the urban 
poor in developing countries are predominantly dependent 
on patronage-like relations—a situation that has severe 
implications for organizing the poor and making them 
capable for collective action.
However, academics and development practitioners 
seldom consider how patron–client relationships may 
influence not only within the intrigue of formal political 
systems but also in the reception of and participation 
in development programs. Community-development 
programs tend to be seen as altruistic, while distribution 
of resources by politicians is seen as self-serving and 
venal. Cox (2009) argues that clientelism shapes not 
only expectations of particularistic returns but people’s 
very ability to engage with “participatory” processes. 
In most of the cases the issue of enhancing the poor 
people’s voice in the governance process through building 
horizontal relationship doesn’t work and it works less 
well the poorer and more dependent people are. De Wit 
and Berner (2009) point out some issues to scrutiny while 
assessing the role of “community based organizations” 
(CBOs) in representing a community in a participatory 
process. Firstly, who are actually the members and do they 
include all ethnic, gender, political and religious groups 
in a community? Secondly, the CBO leadership should 
also be examined to see if it is more self-interested than 
community welfare oriented.
The paper focuses on a United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) sponsored development project 
in Bangladesh and endeavors to explore the logic 
of patronage and its manifestation in a community-
driven development project in urban poor settlements in 
Bangladesh.
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1 .  PAT R O N - C L I E N T E L I S M  A N D 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
In social sciences, patron-client relationships are one of 
many types of interpersonal relationship. Scholarship on 
patron-client relationship has been expanded for more 
than five decades and has witnessed a recent revival 
with political studies’ increasing focus on “informal 
institutions” (Auyero et al., 2009, p.2). Although patron-
clentelism lost its value with the rise of social capital, 
Leonard, Brass et al. (2010, p.476) remind us that “The 
fashionable analytic concept ‘social capital’ can obscure 
some of these continuities [changing nature of patronage], 
so its advantages for other purposes should not displace 
an attention to patronage as well”. They again point out 
that “… it is not that ‘social capital’ and research on it are 
not useful but that political patronage may have a form 
and endurance in rural areas that are independent of social 
capital’s presence” (Leonard et al., 2010, p.476).
Sorauf (1960) defined patronage as “an incentive 
system—a political currency with which to ‘purchase’ 
political activity and political responses” (cited in 
Bearfield, 2009, p.65). Patronage is “the informal, 
personal and face-to-face relationships between actors 
of unequal status and power that persist over time and 
involve the exchange of valued resources” (De Wit & 
Berner, 2009, p.931). These types of relationship between 
patron and clients are featured by mutual intimacy, 
moral and emotional obligation, trust and empathy, the 
sharing of common “pure” basic values, and sometimes 
hierarchical differences. According to Eisenstadt and 
Roniger (1984) the characteristics of such relationship 
are (referred by Auyero et al., 2009, p.4; Dwianto, 1999, 
p.163):
●  Particularistic: In this relationship actors are 
involved in terms of their respective personal 
properties and not in terms of general universal 
categories.
●  Personal: Such relationship is basically based on 
interpersonal obligation manifested by personal 
loyalty, reciprocity, and attachment between patrons 
and clients.
●  Voluntary: A person can enter into, or abandon a 
patron-client relation voluntary.
●  Institutionalized: Since the relationship is basically 
established on an informal understanding between 
two parties, it is not fully legal or contractual. 
However, this type of relationship is institutionalized 
in ritual terms.
Being highly selective, particularistic, hierarchical, 
bonds of dependence and control, and diffuse, these type 
of relations exchange two different type of resources and 
services (Auyero et al., 2009, p.4): “Instrumental” (e.g., 
economic and political), and “sociational” or “expressive” 
(e.g., promises of loyalty and solidarity). Therefore, 
patronage network, based on patron-clientelistic 
relationships, may be conflicting with some community-
based development programs, because clientilism is 
generally opposed to the ethos of participatory process 
(Cox, 2009,  p.964).
The scope for patronage can be explained as a function 
of a lack of resources or services, access problems 
to agencies and institutions, and a lack of enforced 
impersonal rules for the allocation of resources. In urban 
poor slums in the third world countries, patronage is a 
dominant factor of distributing public as well as private 
goods and services. Therefore, it is the main strategy for 
obtaining scarce resource and services for the poor. The 
poor usually prefer to establish or maintaining ongoing 
contact with local intermediaries and politicians then 
organising rallies to voice their demands or initiating 
collective endeavors to meet their needs themselves 
(De Wit & Berner, 2009). Contacting a chief, leaders or 
trusted persons for making things done is a tradition—
a cultural inducement. According to Auyero, Lapegna et 
al. (2009, p.5), this is a routine work and therefore, is not 
limited to material problem solving. Since the poor live 
in ‘destructive uncertainty’ they need to rely on vertical 
patronage relationship. Cutting off patronage relationship 
is dangerous for future survival of the poor (De Wit & 
Berner, 2009). 
From the writings of various writers it becomes clear 
that patronage relationship still exists both in rich and 
poor countries but taking different shape than in the past 
(Auyero et al., 2009; De Wit & Berner, 2009; Leonard 
et al., 2010; O’Reilly, 2010). One of the changing facets 
of today’s patronage is the instability in relationship 
between the patron and client(s). This is mainly because 
of the competition among today’s potential patrons who 
mainly provide supplementary services in contrast to 
the survival services provided by the old day’s patrons 
to their clients. Consequently, patronage relationship 
in poorer countries is gradually taking the form of 
brokerage. Gradually the relationship between patron 
and client is becoming fluid and flexible, giving way 
to an army of brokers and intermediaries who cater 
to the needs of anyone who contracts them for a fee. 
Such mediating can be done on an incidental basis, but 
more often regular patterns develop, depending on the 
locality, price, loyalty and perceived efficacy, which is 
often related to political affiliation. Thus, permanency 
in brokerage may develop (de Wit & Berner 2009, 
p.932). Considering this new shapes, a arrays of new 
scholarship, for example, Auyero, Lapegna et al. (2009) 
points out, in contrast to the traditional view of patron-
client relationship which is contradictory to contentious 
collective action, clientelist and contentious politics 
might connect with each other, sometimes overtly, 
sometimes in more hidden way. And put forward the 
importance of paying attention to the impact of collective 
action on clientelist arrangements.
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2. LOCAL PARTNERSHIP FOR POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION PROJECT: BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION
Local Partnership for Poverty Alleviation (LPUPAP) 
was one of the largest UNDP sponsored poverty 
alleviation projects in Bangladesh under the Ministry of 
Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperatives 
(MLGRD&C). Municipal/city corporations, together 
with Local Government Engineering Department 
(LGED) were the sole implementing agencies of the 
project. The project was implemented in 11 towns 
for eight years from 2001 to 2008, and endeavored to 
improve the socio-economic and political status of the 
urban poor through empowering poor communities 
and building the capacity of local government bodies. 
Instead of the traditional supply-driven approach, the 
project claimed to adopt a community-based, bottom-up 
and demand-driven approach to achieve its development 
objectives: Community groups were formed to identify 
and prioritize needs, communicate effectively with 
local government bodies, and participate in designing, 
implement ing and evaluat ing communi ty  level 
development activities (GHK-International, 2006).
At the community level, there were two types of 
community groups: the primary group (PG) and the 
community development committee (CDC). A PG was 
composed of persons in the community that desired 
to address a development issue of common interest. 
The maximum number of PGs in a community was 
20, each with 15 to 20 members. If a PG started a 
savings and credit operation, it was known as savings 
and credit group (SCG). Every PG had a group leader 
(GL) and secretary elected by the group members for 
two years. Group funds were operated jointly by the 
GL and secretary. PG members were supposed to meet 
once a week to discuss various issues, and workout 
plans to address those issues. On the other hand, a CDC 
was comprised of the GLs and secretaries of the PGs 
in a community. CDC chairperson, vice-chairperson, 
secretary and the treasure were elected by the members 
of the CDC as office bearers (OB) (but in most of the 
cases they were selected) for two years (in practice, after 
being elected/selected once as office bearers, most of 
them continued their positions till the end of the project). 
Every CDC had a constitution of its’ own and was 
supposed to receive accreditation from the local authority 
(municipality/city corporation). CDCs were the focal 
point for implementation for all development activities 
and addressing common development issues faced by the 
entire community. Therefore, CDCs were entrusted with 
a list of functions, for instance, physical implementation 
(settlement improvement),  water and sanitation, 
primary health care, gender awareness, environment 
and solid waste management, literacy campaigns and 
establishing schools, social and cultural activities, law 
and order maintenance etc.. The project provided two 
types of fund directly to the CDCs: the community 
development fund (CDF) for physical infrastructure 
development and the poverty alleviation fund (PAF) for 
income generating activities, capacity building and skill 
development.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
DATA SOURCES
This paper draws on both primary and secondary data. 
Primary data was collected through field investigation 
in 2006 lasting about one month in two LPUPAP 
communities in Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) 
area, situated in the north-west part of Bangladesh. 
For collecting primary data, interview and participant 
observation methods were used. Interviews were 
conducted with 60 community people through a 
questionnaire with both quantitative and qualitative 
type questions. At the beginning of the field work, two 
LPUPAP communities, Baze Kazla (west) and Khulipara, 
were selected purposefully. Few criteria influenced 
the selection of these two communities: First, in both 
communities the project had been working for about five 
years; second, all the project components were introduced 
into both communities; third, project officials helped 
the researcher to identify these communities, where 
interesting variations in performance were expected. 
A total of 30 respondents from each community were 
selected randomly from the LPUPAP group member lists 
and included 10 group leaders (GLs), 10 general group 
members (GGMs), and 10 non-participant community 
members. In addition, semi-structured interviews were 
also been conducted with the two concerned ward 
councilors (WCs), two community development workers 
(CDWs), and the project coordinator in Rajshahi. 
Secondary data was collected from various published 
books, journal articles, unpublished academic thesis 
papers, various LPUPAP documents and relevant web 
materials.
4. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO 
COMMUNITIES
Baze Kazla (west) was composed of two types of 
inhabitants holding two different identities. The eastern 
part of this community was populated by the migrants 
coming from different parts of the country—normally 
were known as Gristho or Bengali. The other part 
(western part) of this community was populated by the 
people who were originally migrated from Murshidabad, 
a District of India, were known as Mohaldar. The term 
Mohaldar means fishermen. These people were distinct 
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from the Bengalis in terms of cultural practices. During 
an informal discussion with the researcher regarding 
various community related issues, one of the inhabitants 
from Mohaldar portion divided up the community by 
giving stress on “we” and “they”. Although identity 
difference between Bengalis and Mohaldar was difficult 
to trace at the surface level, it was powerful and dominant 
in determining local power structure at the community 
level. Unlike Baze Kazla (west), Khulipara Mohaldarpara 
(from this point in this paper this has been termed as 
Khulipara) was mainly populated by Mohaldar people, 
had been living in that locality since long time. Therefore, 
the community was relatively homogeneous in terms of 
ethnical identity.
The total number of household in Baze Kazla (west) 
was about 500 and the total population was 1,968 (543 
were children). In Khulipara there were about 370 
households with 1,968 members (469 were children) 
and was less densely populated than Baze kazla (west). 
The overall socio-economic condition of the inhabitants 
in both communities was almost the same, and most 
of them belonged to the poorest of the poor. However, 
the overall socio-economic condition in Khulipara was 
found better in comparison to Baze Kazla (west) due 
to the presence of various job opportunities since the 
locality was very close to the city center (about 1 km.). 
The entire community of Baze Kazla (west) was under 
the constant threat of river bank erosion as it was outside 
the Rajshahi city protection dam. During the field 
research, inhabitants informed that just fifteen years ago 
the river bank was almost one and half kilometer away 
from now where it is. Besides river bank erosion, the 
community also had to face the plight of flood at regular 
intervals. On the contrary, Khulipara had relatively better 
infrastructural facilities. The community was under the 
city corporation’s water supply coverage. However, the 
community had severe water logging problem mainly 
during the rainy season.
From the collected data it was found that 74% of 
the total residents in Baze Kazla (West) lived below the 
subsistence level as their monthly household income 
was less than TK. 3,000, with the average household 
size of 4.73. Although the economic condition of the 
inhabitants was relatively better in Khulipara, majority 
of the households’ income (53%) were below than BDT 
3000 per month with an average household size of 4.8. 
In both communities generally men were the main wage 
earners and women were mainly involved in reproductive 
activities with few exceptions. Most people were engaged 
in informal sector activities, like rickshaw pulling, 
vegetable vending, petty trading, retail fish trading etc. 
Many of such jobs were seasonal and irregular. However, 
in Khulipara, majority were somehow related with fish 
mongering since it was their traditional occupation, and 
their income was relatively stable as compared to Baze 
Kazla (west) and it was found that 60% of the total 
households in Baze Kazla (west) did not have regular 
income .
The overall literacy rate was 77% and 83% in Baze 
Kazla (west) and Khulipara respectively. However, about 
27% among them could only sign their names in Baze 
Kazla (west) and the figure was 17% for Khulipara. 
The relatively lower socio-economic condition of the 
inhabitants lived in Baze Kazla (west) was manifested in 
their housing facilities: About 47% houses were Kancha1, 
47% were Semi-Pucca and only 7% houses were Pucca. 
Furthermore, about 60% of the total inhabitants of this 
community lived in rental houses. On the contrary, in 
Khulipara, about 17% houses were Pucca and 53% 
were semi-Pucca. Majority of the residents (70%) lived 
permanently in their own houses.
5 .  PAT R O N - C L I E N T E L I S M  A N D 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE 
STUDY AREA
Historically Bangladeshi society is hierarchical and a 
considerable power distance between higher and lower 
classes exists. Although the majority of the population is 
Muslim, the culture is heavily influenced by the Hindu 
caste system. In addition, the culture has also been shaped 
by the colonial heritage, which was principally based 
on master-slave rapport (Rahman, 2000). Therefore, as 
Rahmna (2000) argues, one of the manifestations of such 
hierarchism is the presence of patron-client relationship 
between the advantaged (patrons) who have control over 
resources, and the disadvantaged (clients) who always 
seek their favour to get access to the resources. This 
type of power relation is also dominant in urban poor 
communities through the relationship between community 
leaders (CLs) and the poor. In both communities, under 
the study, there was the existence of such CLs who 
played a crucial role as patrons for the poor in getting 
various services from government agencies (i.e. police, 
power supply department, City Corporation etc.), settling 
community level disputes, getting access to local elected 
representatives and getting government relief during 
natural calamities. The influence of the CLs on the 
community people’s life can be better illustrated by the 
following Table 1 (field visit, 2006).
Table 1
Relationship Between Community Members and CLs
Question Baze Kazla (west) Khulipara
Yes No Yes No
Visited local CLs for solving 
personal problems 73% 27% 50% 50%
Note. Question: Have you ever visited anyone of the leaders in your 
community to solve any of your problems? Please give your answer 
by saying “Yes” or No.
1 It includes Jhupri and Tin-shed type houses.
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The socio-economic and political profile of these CLs 
varied enormously. Some were influential due to their 
family reputation (at least in one case in Baze Kazla), 
although the majority were mainly influential due to 
their strong ties with political parties. Unlike Indian 
slums (de Wit, 2001; Desai, 1995), their leadership was 
seldom rooted in CBOs. In fact, in these two communities 
there was no such CBO of their own representing the 
entire community. However, there was “Shomaj”, an 
informal body of Mohaldar 2 people, in each of these two 
communities which was mainly responsible for settling 
internal disputes and arranging for various religious and 
social festivals. Besides this, there were some women 
groups formed under various NGOs intervention to run 
credit programs. But, none of the groups were active in 
other communal affairs. 
It was observed that many of the poor community 
people were tied with CLs through long-term reciprocal 
relationship. Almost every leader had a group of people 
who were loyal to him and for getting services they used 
to go to him. This long-term relationship was mainly 
based on kinship, friendship and political ideology. 
Besides kinship, the political ideology was also very 
important because of the prevailing competing political 
culture in Bangladesh. Generally the whole nation has 
been divided in favor of the two major political parties—
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh 
Awami League (AL) 3—with an ideological  and 
emotional attachment. In this context, it was unlikely 
that supporters of one party will seek help from a CL 
who was a supporter of another party. Alternatively, CLs 
were also reluctant to provide services to those who had 
different political ideology and attachment, since usually 
they provided services without getting direct personal 
monitory benefit. Instead, they used the perceived loyalty 
in different ways.
The CLs could manage taking benefits of such 
relationship in various ways. Generally, CLs were the 
linking agent between ward4 level politicians (mainly 
WCs and their lackeys) and the community people. 
Besides, some had direct link with the city level 
politicians (for example, with the mayor). These CLs 
were important to the ward and city level politicians as 
they (CLs) were in a great help to secure community 
support in favor of these politicians during local and 
national elections. Moreover, CLs were the key persons 
2 The term Mohaldar means fishermen who are originally migrated 
from Murshidabad, a District of India. These people are distinct 
from the Bengalis in terms of cultural practices. In both communities 
Mohnaldar people are marginalized in terms of socio-economic 
status. 
3 When the field investigation took place in 2006, BNP was the 
ruling party, and AL was the main opposition party (2001- 2006).
4 Ward is the lowest electoral and administrative unit according 
to the present urban local government structure in Bangladesh. 
Accordingly, Rajshai City Corporation is divided into 30 Wards.
in mobilizing community people for mass political 
meetings, political precessions, or supplying picketers 
during Hartals (strikes). In exchange of receiving such 
services from the CLs (clients), the local politicians 
(patrons) usually supported their power as well as 
economic bases in many ways, for example: giving 
money, helping in getting various government contracts, 
and providing and facilitating their access to and 
dominance over various political and social associations. 
There had been a tendency in both the study communities 
that leadership and membership of the PGs and CDCs 
were mostly held by the CLs and their family members, 
or by such persons who had a good rapport with the CLs. 
It became understandable by observing answers given 
by the respondents in response to the question: “do you 
have any close relation with any of them (community 
leaders)?” Whereas 40% of the total respondents (n= 60) 
answered positively, the figure was about 75% in the 
case of the office bearers (6 out of 8 office bearers). 
Patron-client relationship can also be better understood 
by the way LPUPAP groups were formed. Most of the 
group members informed that they heard about the 
project for the first time from the LPUPAP group leaders/
members, which indicates that instead of relying on 
adequate information sharing among the community 
people, the project officials mainly depended on key 
persons to form groups. One of the OBs described her 
experience in this way: 
One day the ward commissioner called me upon his office and 
introduced me to the project worker (CDW). Then she informed 
me about the project and encouraged me to form a group. He 
also assured me that in return I will be offered the position of 
group leader. (field visit, 2006).
It is quite evident that instead of forming the groups 
first, the project workers mainly identified the key persons 
in the community with the help of CLs as prescribed by 
the ward level politicians (mainly the WCs). These key 
persons then took initiatives to form PGs and eventually 
they were offered the position of group leaders; and 
finally, these PG leaders formed CDCs. 
As a result, it is clear that the selection of group 
members as well as OBs were heavily influenced by the 
logic of patron-clientelism, where the local politicians 
and CLs acted as patrons and the group members as 
clients. Subsequently, the CDC office bearers also 
appeared as patrons to the general LPUPAP group 
members. It was also found that some of the office 
bearers were using their positions for personal political 
gain, especially in Baze Kazla (west) where BNP had 
absolute dominance at the time of field investigation. 
For example, one of the office bearers in Baze Kazla 
(west)—who was also the president of the women wing 
of BNP of the concerned ward and had a good rapport 
with the concerned pro-BNP WC (had been elected for 
three terms consecutively)—informed me that she was 
going to be a candidate in the next local election. She 
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also mentioned that her position in the CDC had given 
her an opportunity to build good rapport with community 
people and city level politicians as well. The use of group 
leadership position for her own political gains became 
apparent when the researcher went for a walk with her 
within the study community and some people demanded 
a walkway on their side of the settlement. She answered: 
“if I wins the upcoming local election, I will allocate 
budget for the work otherwise not”. In this way, project 
resource distribution was more politicized in Baze Kazla 
(west). It was found that the more socio-economic status 
and strong political ties of an office bearer had, the more 
she/he would have been able to use the group leadership 
position for personal gains. Thus, some of the office 
bearers’ leadership position in the project groups helped 
to reinforce the pre-existing patron-client relationship. 
Moreover, the LPUPAP groups were also been used for 
political purposes in another way. When the respondents 
were asked the question: “Are you or anyone of your 
family member a member of any political party, or do 
participate in any political activities or, did campaigning 
for any candidate in national or local elections?” a good 
number of respondents in Baze Kazla (west) expressed 
that when asked by local politicians, it was obligatory for 
them to attend major political mass meetings in exchange 
of their membership in the groups. However, the situation 
was somewhat different in Khulipara—although not in a 
greater extent.
Unlike Baze kazla (west), in Khulipara there was 
strong influence of AL besides BNP. The office bearers 
took their office during the period of the previous WC, 
who had attachment with BNP. Therefore, the present 
WC (at the time of the field investigation in August 
2006) who was a supporter of AL could not exert a great 
deal of influence on LPUPAP groups. Thus, the co-
existence of multi-party domination provided greater 
room for fair distribution of resources (less politicised 
and need based) in Khulipara. As Desai (1995, p.228) 
observes:
If another party is alongside the party in power is presented 
in the area in some strength, the situation does not change 
fundamentally, but the capacity of the slum dwellers to 
manipulate and maneuver between the two is somewhat 
increased. 
On  the  con t r a ry,  i n  Baze  Kaz l a  (wes t )  t he 
participatory process had merely been used as a control 
mechanism. This situation contradicts with the opinion 
of Mukhopadhyay (1993, p.341), who argues for the 
homogeneous local political power situation for effective 
community participation and collective action which 
induces more development.
CONCLUSION
Patron-clientelism plays a crucial role in shaping the 
extent and the nature of participation and collective action 
in community development projects. It is seen from 
the case study that the long-term patron-clientelistic 
relationship has been more dominant than short-term 
brokerage type relationship due to the existing typical 
socio-political culture in Bangladesh. This contradicts 
the findings of de Wit (2001) in Indian urban slums that 
patronage/brokerage type relationship has gradually been 
replacing patron-clientelistic relationship. This study 
paper suggests that the level of dominance of patron-
client relationship depends mainly on the community 
specific socio-political contexts. The presence of multi-
political parties’ influence in a community reduces the 
influence of patron-client relationship, which in turn 
contributes to more meaningful participation. This 
finding contradicts the view of Mukhopadhyay (1993) 
who is an opinion that the presence of homogeneous 
political power leads to more effective community 
participation.
REFERENCES
Auyero, J., Lapegna, P., & Poma, F. P. (2009). Patronage 
politics and contentious collective action: A recursive 
relationship. Latin American Politics and Society, 51(1), 
1-31. 
Bearfield, D. A. (2009). What is patronage? A critical re-
examination. Public Administraion Review (January/
February), 64-76. 
Chandra, K. (2007). Counting heads: A theory of voter and 
elite behaviour in patronage democracies. In H. Kitschelt 
& S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies: 
patterns of democratic accountability and political 
compet i t ion  (pp.94-110) .  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press.
Cox, J. (2009). Active citizenship or passive clentelism? 
Accountability and development in solomon islands. 
Development in Practice, 19(8), 964-980. 
de Wit, J. (2001). Partnership, participation and patronage 
relations of urban poverty alleviation in Bangalore Slums. 
ISS working papers. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
De Wit, J., & Berner, E. (2009). Progressive Patronage? 
Municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and the limits to slum 
dwellers’ empowerment. Development and Change, 40(5), 
927-947. 
Desai, V. (1995). Community participation and slum housing: A 
study of bombay. Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi: 
Sage Publications.
Dwianto, R. D. (1999). Patron-client relations reconsidered: 
Comparing civil defense group in Danto earthquake and 
Jakarta riots of May 1998. International Journal of Japanese 
Sociology, (8), 161-181. 
19 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Parvaz Azharul Huq  (2016). 
Canadian Social Science, 12(8), 13-19
GHK-International. (2006). Report of the evaluation mission: 
Local partnership for urban poverty alleviation. Dhaka: 
Local Partnerships for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project.
Kitscheld, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, clients 
and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and 
political competition. New Yord: Cambridge University Press.
Leonard, D. K., Brass, J. N., Nelson, M., Ear, S., Fahey, D., 
Fairfield, T., . . . Dijkman, J. (2010). Does patronage still 
drive politics for the rural poor in the developing world? 
A comparative perspective from the livestock sector. 
Development and Change, 41(3), 475-494. 
Mukhopadhyay, A. (1993). Community participation in 
urban development. In B. Mohanty (Ed.), Urbanisation 
in developing countries-basic services and community 
participation (pp.331-344). New Delhi: Institute of Social 
Science.
O’Reilly, K. (2010). The promise of Patronage: Adapting and 
adopting neoliberal development. Antipode, 42(1), 179-
200. 
Rahman, M. T. (2000). The role of parliamentary committees in 
ensuring bureaucratic accountability in Bangladesh. (M. 
Phil. dissertation). University of Bergen.
